OHIO SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT CHALLENGE TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE REAGAN TOKES ACT IS RIPE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DIRECT APPEAL OF THE INITIAL SENTENCE
Posted in Ohio Constitutional Modernization Commission, Posts on Mar 27th, 2022
Ohio courts are not bound by the case or controversy requirements of Article III of the U.S. Constitution in determining whether cases in the Ohio courts are justiciable, but they are free to look to federal principles in developing state justiciability requirements, including the ripeness requirement.
Under the Reagan Tokes Law, O.R.C. 2967.271, which became effective on March 22, 2019, the state established indefinite-sentencing provisions for people convicted of non-life-sentence felony offenses of the first or second degree. As described by the Ohio Supreme Court, under this statute “there is a presumption that the offender will be released on the expiration of his or her minimum prison term or earned early-release date, but the statute enables [the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction] to rebut the presumption and keep the offender incarcerated up to the expiration of his or her maximum prison term.”
In this case, the defendant claimed that O.R.C. 2926.271 violates the separation-of-powers requirement of the Ohio Constitution and his rights to a trial by jury and due process of law under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and their parallel Ohio provisions.
Numerous Ohio prisoners had challenged the constitutionality of this provision, and lower Ohio courts were split on whether challenges could be made on direct appeal at the time of the initial sentencing or whether the ripeness doctrine required a prisoner to wait until the administrative application of an extension, which could then be challenged in a habeas corpus proceeding.
On March 16, 2021, the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Maddox, ____ Ohio St.3d ____ , 2022-Ohio-764, 2022 WL 790470, ____ N.E.3d ____ (2022), held in a 4-3 decision that a criminal defendant’s challenge to the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law was ripe for review in the defendant’s direct appeal of his conviction and prison sentence. None of the Ohio justices addressed the merits of the defendant’s claim, and only one of the three dissenting justices discussed the “merits” of the ripeness issue. The two other dissenting justices questioned whether there was a split in the district courts of appeals, as well as whether this case was a proper vehicle for addressing the ripeness issue.
In framing the issue, the court relied primarily on Ohio cases that addressed the relevance of ripeness in determining whether a controversy was justiciable.
In order to be justiciable a controversy must be ripe for review.” Keller v. Columbus, 100 Ohio St.3d 192, 2003-Ohio-5599, 797 N.E.2d 964, ¶ 26; see also Pack v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio St.3d 129, 438 N.E.2d 434 (1982), paragraph one of the syllabus. Article IV, Section 4(B) of the Ohio Constitution provides that “[t]he courts of common pleas * * * shall have original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters * * * as provided by law,” and this court has stated that “it is the duty of every judicial tribunal to decide actual controversies between parties legitimately affected by specific facts and to render judgments which can be carried into effect.” Fortner v. Thomas, 22 Ohio St.2d 13, 14, 257 N.E.2d 371 (1970). “ ‘The basic principle of ripeness may be derived from the conclusion that “judicial machinery should be conserved for problems which are real or present and imminent, not squandered on problems which are abstract or hypothetical or remote.” ’ ” State ex rel. Elyria Foundry Co. v. Indus. Comm., 82 Ohio St.3d 88, 89, 694 N.E.2d 459 (1988), quoting Comment, Mootness and Ripeness: The Postman Always Rings Twice, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 867, 876 (1965), quoting Davis, Ripeness of Governmental Action for Judicial Review, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1122, 1122 (1955).
The court also looked to federal court decisions on ripeness for guidance, and the court further held that the prudential concerns of ripeness did not prevent the issue from being addressed on direct appeal.
Ripeness is distinct from standing, but both doctrines require that “an injury in fact be certainly impending.” Natl. Treasury Emps. Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1427 (D.C.Cir.1996). “[I]f a threatened injury is sufficiently ‘imminent’ to establish standing, the constitutional requirements of the ripeness doctrine will necessarily be satisfied.” Id. at 1428. Then, “only the prudential justiciability concerns of ripeness can act to bar consideration of the claim.” Id. The prudential-justiciability concerns include (1) whether the claim is fit for judicial decision and (2) whether withholding court consideration will cause hardship to the parties.
Because the defendant had been sentenced under O.R.C. 2967.271, the court concluded that no further factual development was necessary to analyze the challenge. And it further concluded that a delay in reviewing the issue would result in duplicative litigation, would force the defendant (and others appealing their sentences) to endure potential violations of their constitutional rights while waiting to see whether they are denied release at the expiration of their minimum prison terms.
